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Premchand v. State of Haryana : An epitome
of soft-justice syndrome?
S.Y. JOGA RAO

1. Introduction
Rape is a crime against women. While it is a fantasy to man, it is a nightmare to
woman. Rape represents all the hatred and oppression of woman in society
concentrated in one act. It is not just an aberration, but a deviation from the norms of
sexual and social behaviour in the society.l
The offence of rape is exclusively dealt with under sections 375 to 376D of the
Indian Penal Code in its Chapter on 'offences affecting human body'.2 Considering the
inadequate punishment that was prescribed for the offence of rape before 1983, the
Law Commission of India had suggested drastic amendments in 1972 3 which included
the enhancement of degree of punishment and certain provisions relating to the
custodial rapes. The custodial rapes incIude,(i) intercourse by public servant with a woman in his custody;
(ii)

intercourse by Superintendent,
institutions;

etc. with inmate of woman's

or children's

(iii)

intercourse by managers, etc. of hospital with mentally disordered

patient.

Unfortunately our Legislature paid no heed to these recommendations.
Reacting
to the very unfortunate incidents of custodial rapes in Ramizabi and Mathura,4 the
Law Commission has again submitted suggestions on effective penal measures in
respect of rape including custodial rapes by police officials. Fortunately this time the
Parliament responded to these suggestions and brought about necessary amendments to
the provisions relating to rape. Two far-reaching effects of the amendment relate to:
(i)

the improved protection of womt:n from custodial rapes, and

(ii)

imposition of minimum sentence by way of punishment.

The
and how
judgment
the issue
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

aim of this paper i~to critically examine the object of minimum sentence
Indian Judiciary interpreted the same in the light of recent Supreme Court
in Premchalld alld allother v. State of HaryanaS which inter alia focuses on
of custodial rape and minimum sentence.

Mead. Andrea, Against Rape (1986). p. 2.
Indian Penal Code, sections 299-377.
Law Commission of India, .J2/1d Report (Indian Penal Code), 1971, pp. 275-280.
TlIkaram v. Slate of Maharaslura (1979) 2 SCC 143.
Premchand & anolher v. State of Haryana IT 1989 (1) SC 158.
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2. Object of punishment
The object of punishment is the prevention of crime, and every punishment is
intended to have a double effect, namely, to prevent the person who has committed a
crime from repeating the act or ,omission and to prevent other members of the
community from committing similar crimes. As regards a particular offender there
are three ways of punishment against repetition of an offence,(i)

by taking from him the power of offending (incapacitation),

(ii) by taking away the desire of offending (reformation),
(iii) by makine;him afraid of offending (intimidation).6
This principle was reflected in the judgment given by Supreme Court in Goswamy's
case,7where the court observed:

"The main purpose of the sentence broadly stated is that the accused must
realise that he has committed an act which is not only harmful to the society
of which he forms an integral part but is also harmful to his own futt;re,
both as an individual and as a member of the society. Punishment is
designed to protect society by deterring potential offenders as also by
preventing the guilty party from repeating the offence; it is also designed to
reform the offender and reclaim him as a law abiding citizen for the good
of the society as a whole. Reformatory, deterrent and punitive aspects of
punishment thus play their due part in judicial thinking while determining
this question. In modern civilized societies, however, reformatory aspect is
being given somewhat greater importance. Too lenient as well as too harsh
sentence both lose their efficaciousness. One does not deter and other may
frustrate thereby making the offender a hardened criminal."
The policy of the law generally is to fIx a maximum penalty, which is intended
only for the extreme cases. The determination of appropriate punishment in a
particular case has always been left to the court for the weighty reason that no two
cases would ever be alike, and the circumstances under which the offence was
committed and the moral turpitude attaching to it wculd be matters within the special
knowledge of the court which has tried the case. There can be no rule of general
application laying down a specifIc quantum of punishment that should be inflicted in
the case of a particular offence. A sound judicial discretio~ on the part of the judge in
awarding punishment can alone distinguish one case from another and fIt the
punishment to the crime in each individual case.s
The court in fIxingthe punishment for any particular crime, generally takes into
consideration:
(i) the nature of the offence and the circumstances in which it was committed;
(ii) the degree of deliberation shown by the offender;
6.

Halsbury's Laws of England, III Edn., (1955), Vol. X, p. 487.

7.

(1974)3 see 85.

8.

Law Commission of India, 14th Repon, p. 838.
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(iii) the antecedents

of prisoner

upto the time of sentence,
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his age and

character;
(iv)
(v)

the special circumstance
that particular locality;

such as the prevalence

of a particular

offence in

the abuse of one's position in public service;

(vi) the nature of the legislation creating the offence where it is apparent that
heavy pecuniary penalties may be required.9
The introduction of minimum sentence in the ambit of penological jurisprudence
is relatively of recent origin. Of late, there is an increasing tendency shown by the
legislature towards prescribing a minimum sentence in the case of some offences. The
principal reason underlying this change in policy appears to be a feeling that courts
seldom award sentences which would have a deterrent effect, particularly in certain
types of offences which are necessarily to be dealt with sternly in the interest of
society. If, a minimum sentence was to be prescribed for certain offences or classes of
offences, the award of the really needed deterrent punishment would be assured in
these cases.lO
The notion that 'more severe is the punishment, the greater is the deterrent
effect', is itself a matter of controversy. It has not been ascertained whether there has
been a fall in the commission of those offences where an enhanced penalty has been
assured by prescribing minimum sentences. In dealing with deterrcnt effect of really
severe sentences, Puttkammer observcs:
"If we are hopeful of the curative cffects of a threat, we have to make the
threat unpleasant, which is another way of saying that we have tb be severe.
But we tend to lose sight of a factor which is at the very least as important
as severity and which is more probably more important. The factor is
certainly of punishment."t!
In the entire body of the Indian Penal Code there are only a few sections which
prescribe a minimum penalty.12 During recent years Parliament had passed some
enactments providing for minimum sentcnces.13

9.
10.
11.
12.

Supra note 6.
Supra note 8.
Supra note 8 at p. 839.

(i)'
(ii)

(iii)
(il')

(1')

13.

(i)
(ii)

Section 121 which prescribes death or imprisonment for life.
Section 302 provides for the punishment of imprisollment for life or death.
Section 303. where a person who is undcr a sentcnce of imprisonment for life commit:
murder. he shall he punished with death. Thcre is no alternative punishment prescribed fOI
such a case.
Under section 397, a minimum sentcnce of seven years has been provided in the case of a
person who uses a deadly weapon and causes grievous hurt to any person at the time of
committing the robbery.
Under section 398. if a person attempting to commit robbery or dacoity is armed with a
deadly weapon. he shall be punished with not less than 7 years of imprisonment.
Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 1'.147(as amcnded in 1958).
Section 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 1954.
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3. Punishment for rape
According to section 376(1) the minimum punishment for rape is seven years
imprisonment and the maximum, life imprisonment and also with fine. The judge may
impose a sentence of less than seven years for reasons to be mentioned in the
judgment.
Rape by a police officer, within the limits of the police station or in the precincts
of a police station, on a woman in his or subordinate's custody:
(a) or by a public servant who takes advantage of his official position and
commits rape on a woman in his or his subordinate's custody;
(b) or by any person in the management or staff of a jail, remand home or

other place of custody of an inmate;
(c) or by any person in the management of a hospital or by any person on a
pregnant woman;
(d) or on a woman under twelve years of age;
(e) or gang rape ....

is punishable with a minimum sentence of ten years'
rigorous imprisonment and the maximum life imprisonment and also with
fine. The offence is cognizable and non-bailable. The judge may impose a
sentence of less than ten years of imprisonment for reasons to be
mentioned in the judgment.

The introduction of minimum sentence in the case of offence of rape is yet
another instance where Parliament felt the necessity of severity of punishment, due to
alarming increase of the occurrence of rape. Custodial atrocities on women and
women under trials by police officials are not uncommon in these days. It is not just
that atrocities against women are increasing, but more and more cases are being
reported, the occurrence of which agitated the minds of the public.
Even in the case of minimum sentence, the judges have been given discretionary
powers t6 award less than minimum sentence for reasons to be mentioned in the
judgment. Thus it shows that even the new concept of minimum sentence in the case
of offence of rape is not absolutely mandatory in nature. The judges are given enough
scope to exercise their discretion in awarding sentence. The exercise of this discretion
is a matter of prudence. The judge while exercising such discretion has to bear in
mind the object of minimum sentence. After thorough examination of the facts and
circumstances of the· case, he has to decide with a critical insight supported by
reasonable objective standards. In this new dimension of sentencing policy, the rule is
minimum sentence and awarding less than minimllm sentence is the exception.
Having examined the object of minimum sentence, it is proposed to discuss how
the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of minimum sentence in the case of
Premchand v. State of Haryana.14 The facts of the case as reported in the judgment
are:

}4.

IT 1989 (1) SC 159, para 2.
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"The appellants herein along with one Ravi Shankar (since acquitted by the High
Court) took their trial on the accusations that Ravi Shankar committed rape on the
prosecutrix Suman Rani (examined as PW-17 before the trial court in the field at
Bhawani Khera on two occasions, i.e., firstly on March 15, 1984 and thereafter on
March 18; 1984 and that later on May 31, 1984 Ravi Shankar abducted Suman Rani
from Bhawani Khera and took her to Jammu via Bhiwani, that two appellants (who
were arrayed as accused No.2 & 3 who were police officials along with Ravi Shankar)
took Ravi Shankar and Suman Rani in different rooms and committed rape on Suman
Rani one after another and thereafter the appellant Premchand took Ravi Shankar
and the victim girl to the railway station and left them there. On the said accusations
Ravi Shankar took his trial under sections 366 and 376 of Indian Penal Code and the
two appellants herein under section 376 of Indian Penal Code. It may be stated that
there was a joint trial against all the three accused. The trial court found all the three
accused guilty under the respective charges and convicted and sentenced Ravi
-Shankar to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years under each of the charges with
the direction that all the sentences were to run concurrently. The two appellants in the
case under review were convicted under section 376 of Indian Penal Code and each of
them was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years as
provided under sub-section (2) of section 376 with an observation that: "there is no
reason for awarding less than the minimum sentence prescribed". All the three
convicted preferred separate and independent appeals before the High Court which
disposed of all the three appeals by a common judgment. The appellate court
acquitted Ravi Shankar of all the charges and set aside the sentence imposed on him on
the ground that the prosecution had not successfully proved that the prosecutrix Suman
Rani wa~ below 18 years of age and that "She was a willing party and had been going
around with Ravi Shankar and been having sex with him of her free will." The court
dismissed the appeals preferred by the two appellants observing "that the case against
these two appel/ants certaillly stallds proved beyond a shadow of doubt. ,,15Coming to the
. >Qllestion of sentence, the appellate Court held that "there was no scope for reducing
the minimum sentence awarded to each of the appellants who are now b~fore us."
While initiating arguments on behalf of the appellant, the learned counsel urged
that the:
"Victim Suman Rani was a woman of questionable character and easy virtue
with lewd and lascivious behaviour and that the very fact that this girl had not
complained of the alleged rape said to have been committed at police station
by these two appellants to anyone till she was interrogated by PW-30 on
March 28, 1984 show that the present version is not worthy of acceptance."16
The Supreme Court speaking through Hon'ble B.c. Ray and Ratnavel Pandian,
JJ, rejected the above contention, while accepting the argument that the prosecution
has established its case against both the appellants satisfactorily and as such the
judgment of the High Court has to be upheld.17
15.
16.
17.

Emphasis added.
IT 1989 (1) SC 159, para 3.
Supra nOle 16, para 4.
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While considering the quantum of sentence the Supreme Court observed that:
."No doubt an offence of this nature has to be viewed very seriously and has
to be dealt with condign punishment.
But the peculiar facts and
circumstances of this case coupled with the conduct of the victim girl, in our
view do not call for the minimum sentence as prescribed under section~76,
sub-section (2). On the other hand, we hold that the proviso to that section
can be invoked in the present case and a sub-minimum sentence will meet
the ends of justice. Accordingly while affirming the conviction of both these
appellants as confirmed by the High Court, we reduce the sentence by
imprisonment
in respect of each of the appellants from 10 years to 5
years,',!8

This judgment is a milestone in that it crystallises many of the painful issues
which have historically dogged rape and its punishment. But its legal, social and
psychological implications are simply frightening and urge a detailed examination.
After having a glimpse of the above judgment undeniably one would be of opinion
that the severity of sentence is not linked to the legal definition of the crime
committed but to some arbitrary qualification which somehow redefines the crime
itself.!9

4.

Evidence as to past sexual experience of prosecutrix
ascertaining the guilt and quantum of sentence

in

The question is, in order to ascertain the guilt whether past sexual experience,of
prosecutrix will be taken into consideration or not? The answer would be undoubt~dly
in the negative. The protection of the law of rape is available to any woman
irrespective of her involvement in past sexual relations. Rape is a rape--whether
it is
committed on a woman, who was used to sexual intercourse or is a /prostitute or a
virgin. The law of rape does not provide for any discriminatory treatment. In my
humble opinion, in a case of rape, if prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that
the off~!we of rape was committed, under no circumstances, past sexual experience of
~q~~secutrix can be relied upon to take any lenient view.
It i~ very interesting to examine the judgment
regard. The Sessions Judge observed:
"The law against the offence of rape
protection of falIible earthly mortals
even a girl of easy virtue is entitled
compelled to have sexual intercourse

of the Sessions Court

in this

and alIied offences was created for the
and not goddesses. All said and done
to the protection of law and cannot be
against her wilI.20

At this juncture it is pertinent to examine the recommendations
made by the
Law Commission with reference to the past character of the prose:cutrix in the case of
the offence of rape. The Commission in its report dealt in depth the question as to
18.

19.
20.

Supra note 16, P. 160, para 7.
Purewal. Jasjil. 'What Price Vil'lue' in Indian £'press dated February 12, 1989.
Supra note 15.
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"how far should the past sexual history of the victim of rape be allowed to be given in
evidence in court on behalf of the accused."21
It opined that the evidence as to prosecutrix's past sexual relations either with
the accused or with any other person is admissible in the Court by virtue of sections
14,2211,238,lA, 925, 155(4)26of the Evidence Act. In this regard Law Commission
observed that in a case of rape or attempted rape, even if past immoral character of
the 'prosecutrix' is technically permissible as substantive evidence or in crossexamination under the present law, the position needs to be modified and such
evidence or cross-examination should be prohibited except as regards sexual relations
with the accused.
The reasons for such an approach are as follows:
(a)

in so far as such evidence related to the issue of consent, there are social
evils resulting from the tendering of such evidence and those evils counterbalance the possible probative value of the evidence;

(b)

in so far as such evidence does not relate to the issue of consent and is
offered merely to injure the character or shake the credit of the woman, it
is not proper for the law to countenance it when such evidence cannot be
given against men who are victims of sexual offences.

Basing on the above reasons the Commission recommended a new section to be
inserted as section 53A in the Evidence Act, which runs as follows:
"In a prosecution for rape or attempt to commit rape, where the question of
consent to sexual intercourse or attempted sexual intercourse is at issue,
evidence of the character of the prosecutrix or her previous sexual
experience with any person other than the accused shall not be relevant on
the issue of such consent or the quality of consent."
But Parliament did not pay heed to the above recommendation.
According to section 376(1), if the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt
that the offence of rape was committed by a person, the judge is under an obligation
to award minimum sentence unless any mitigating circumstance which is peculiar to
the facts of the case warrants less than minimum sentence. In other words, the
presence of mitigating circumstance has a direct nexus with th~ minimum sentence.
What is a mitigating circumstance is a difficult question to answer. In this case the
judgment centred around a mitigating circumstance which creates apprehension in the
minds of both lawyers and layman. The mitigating circumstance in which the Supreme
Court rested the case was that Suman Rani was of questionable character and of easy
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Supra note 8.
Indian Evidence Act, section 14 dealing with mind, or of body or bodily feeling.
Indian Evidence Act, section 11 dealing with 'when facts not otherwise relevant become relevant'.
Indian Evidence Act, section 8 dealing with motive, preparation and previou~ or subsequent
conduct.
Indian Evidence Act, section 9 dealing with 'Facts necessary to explain or introduce relevant facts'.
Indian Evidence Act, section 155(4) dealing with 'Impeaching credit of witness'.

188

National Law School JOllmal

virtue with lewd and lascivious behaviour. Now the unanswered question is whether
questionable
character of the prosecutrix can be construed as a mitigating
circumstance in order to award less than minimum sentence. It is quite alarming to
note that the Supreme Court came to such conclusion about the character of the
prosecutrix, when learned counsel for the accused rested on a medical report to
surmise that the victim was used to sexual intercourse. The nature of the mitigating
circumstance on which Supreme Court relied strikes at the very object of law relating
to rape. The reflections of this judgment undoubtedly create far-reaching adverse
effects.
In conclusion it is worth quoting Munroe Smith:27
"In these efforts to give the sense of Social Justice articulate expression in
rules and in principles, the method of the law finding experts has always
been experimental. The rules and principles of case laws have never been
treated as final truths, but as working hypothesis, continually rested in those
great laboratories of law, the Court of Justice. Every new case is an
experiment, and if the accepted rule which seems applicable yields a result
which is felt to be unjust, the rule is considered. It may not be modified at
once, for the attempt to do absolute justice in every single case would make
the development and maintenance of general rules impossible but if a rule
continues to work injustice it will eventually be reformulated.
The
principles themselves are continually restated, for if the rules derived from
a principle do not work well, the principle itself must ultimately be reo
examined."

* * * *

27.

Smith, Munroe;Jurispmdence (1909) Columbia University Press, p. 21.

